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The incidence of natural calamities induced by global climate change
is increasing. Governments lack the capacity to properly protect
households living in areas that are prone to natural disasters like floods,
earthquakes, cyclones, and associated storm surges. As a result, a
household might be forced to engage in private defensive actions and
investments to protect its members and property from recurring natural
disaster events. However, the household’s incentives to allocate funds to
support its private defensive strategies against damages from a future
natural disaster event might also be influenced by its access to private
inward remittances and charities. This factor might be more pertinent
among households who are representative of a developing country
economy and located in vulnerable areas prone to more frequent natural
disasters. Considering these issues of households’ accessibility to public
programs and private inward remittances, there is a need to better
understand the linkages through which households’ decision to pursue
private defensive strategies (or private protection activities) might be
influenced. This has significant policy implications especially for lowand-middle income countries vulnerable to natural disasters. We introduce
a theoretical model of household private investment in protection against
damages from a natural disaster event given the presence of public
programs and the possibility of receiving inward remittances from
members of the household.
To keep our exposition simple, we assume the household is
representative of a developing country economy and vulnerable to a
frequent natural disaster event, such as cyclones or hurricanes as a result
of being located in coastal areas. We assume that the household’s risk
associated with storm-inflicted damages is endogenous. This latter
presumption is based on the premise that a household through its private
actions can avoid or mitigate the negative impacts of a major storm event.
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Under incomplete market insurance, we classify household’s private storm
protection actions into two categories: (1) self-protection, a form of exante prevention, which are private investments that can reduce expected
storm-inflicted damages from occurring; and, (2) self-insurance, a form of
ex-post adaptation, which are private investments in human, physical, and
social capital that can reduce losses in the event of storm-inflicted
damages. From a low-and middle-income country perspective, examples
of self-protection include converting a mud-built house to brick, raising
the height of the homestead, moving the house inside an embankment,
taking refuge in a neighbor’s house, and locating further away from the
shoreline to a safer place. Examples of self-insurance include income
source diversification, crop and plot diversification, reciprocal gift
exchanges, and inter-and intra-household income transfers based on
insurance motives (or informal risk sharing). All these possibilities are
directly or indirectly resulting from household private investments in
human, physical, and social capital to reduce the severity or magnitude of
damages to property as a result of a major storm event.
Under the endogenous risk framework, the household model of private
investment in protection against storm-inflicted damages reveals four
household types: (1) households pursuing both self-protection and selfinsurance; (2) households practicing only self-protection but no selfinsurance; (3) households pursuing only self-insurance but no selfprotection; and, (4) households practicing no self-protection and no selfinsurance.
Comparative static results of our theoretical model reveal that for a
risk-averse household, ex-ante public programs, such as government
spending on infrastructures in terms of embankments, dams, roads and
highways, education on major storms and early storm warning systems,
lead to more private investments in self-protection (crowding-in), but less
private investments in self-insurance (crowding-out). On the other hand,
private investment allocations for self-protection declines (crowding-out)
but self-insurance increases (crowding-in) if households have more access
to ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs once
the major storm event has occurred. However, we can trace out the
possible influences of ex-post public programs on private storm protection
actions by assuming a household is risk-neutral rather than risk-averse.
Regarding the influence of private inward remittances, we find that selfprotection declines if households have more access to private remittances
and charities. This implies that self-protection and private remittances are
substitutes. Conversely, self-insurance increases with more access to
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private remittances. Hence, self-insurance expenditures and private
remittances are complements.
There is significant evidence of some of the important conditions
applied in our theoretical model. However, the direction of the sign of
relationships between public programs and private storm protection
behavior is an empirical question to provide credence to our theoretical
underpinnings. Same also applies in determining the sign of the
relationships between private inward remittances received from a migrant
family member and its possible influence on private storm protection
behavior. It will be interesting to see whether access to either public
programs or private inward remittances is enough to deter or encourage
private investments to reduce risks from storm-inflicted damages to
property by averting the likelihood as well as reducing the severity or
magnitude of such risk event.
Our theory of household private investment in storm protection could
be generalized to all coastal communities that are affected by climate
change. Hypotheses based on the research questions and the propositions
derived from the theoretical model could be tested empirically. Findings
from such studies could recommend the steps that the governments might
take to develop an institutional setup under joint public-private
partnerships by encouraging more collective and individual participation
in storm-protection activities among the vulnerable communities. By
identifying and nurturing such form of institutions, governments
representing the low-and middle-income countries would be able to
mitigate the impacts of market failures due to moral hazard and adverse
selection that arise from public-sponsored programs. In addition, we
consider that identifying the channels through which private inward
remittances directly and indirectly influence private storm protection
behavior or attitudes towards reducing the likelihood as well as severity
from storm-inflicted damages to property has some serious policy
implications in the future. Outcomes from our research will be particularly
relevant for developing countries’ (especially from south-east Asia and
small island states of the Pacific) intention to promote and support
sustainable development projects by improving their resilience and
response capacity to cope against natural disaster events as a result of
global climate change.
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